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Abstract. The “Machiavellian intelligence” hypothesis (also referred to as the “social brain” hypothesis)
posits that large brains and distinctive cognitive abilities of humans have evolved via a spiraling arms race in
which social competitors developed increasingly sophisticated “Machiavellian” strategies. Here we build a math-
ematical model aiming to explore this hypothesis. In the model, genes control brains which invent and learn
strategies (memes) which are used by males to gain advantage in competition for mates. We show that the
dynamics of intelligence has three distinct phases. During the dormant phase only newly invented memes are
present in the population. During the cognitive explosion phase the population’s meme count and the learning
ability, cerebral capacity (controlling the number of different memes that the brain can learn socially and use), and
Machiavellian fitness of individuals rapidly increase in a runaway fashion. During the saturation phase natural
selection resulting from the costs of having large brains checks further increases in cognitive abilities. Overall, our
results suggest that the mechanisms underlying the “Machiavellian intelligence” hypothesis can indeed result in
the evolution of significant cognitive abilities on the time scale of 10 to 20 thousand generations. We show that
cerebral capacity evolves faster and to a larger degree than learning ability. The increase in brain size results in a
significant reduction in viability thus creating conditions that favor rapid evolution of the mechanisms reducing
the costs of having large brains (such as postponing much of the brain growth to after birth and reduction of the
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guts). Our model suggests that there may be a tendency towards a reduction in cognitive abilities (driven by the
costs of having a large brain) as the reproductive advantage of having a large brain decreases and the exposure
to memes increases in modern societies.
There are many features that make us a “uniquely unique species” but the most crucial of them are
related to the size and complexity of our brain (Geary, 2005, Roth and Dicke, 2005, Striedter, 2005).
The brain size in Homo sapiens increased in a runaway fashion over a period of a couple hundred thou-
sand years but then stabilized or even slightly declined in the last 35-50 thousand years (Geary, 2005,
Ruff et al., 1997, Striedter, 2005). In humans, the brain is very expensive metabolically: it represents
about 2% of the body’s weight but utilizes about 20% of total body metabolism at rest (Holloway, 1996).
The two burning questions are what factors drove the evolution of brain size and why our ancestors 50,000
years ago needed the brains they had. A number of potential answers have been hotly debated focusing
on the effects of climatic (Vrba, 1995), ecological (Russon and Begun, 2004), and social factors. One con-
troversial set of ideas (Alexander, 1990, Byrne and Whiten, 1988, Dunbar, 1998, 2003, Flinn et al., 2005,
Geary, 2005, Humphrey, 1976, Roth and Dicke, 2005, Striedter, 2005, Whiten and Byrne, 1997) coming
under the rubric of the “Machiavellian intelligence” or “social brain” hypothesis identifies selective forces
resulting from social competitive interactions as the most important factor in the evolution of hominids,
who at some point in the past became an ecologically dominant species (Alexander, 1990, Flinn et al.,
2005). These forces selected for more and more effective strategies of achieving social success (including
deception, manipulation, alliance formation, exploitation of the expertise of others, etc.) and for abil-
ity to learn and use them. The social success translated into reproductive success (Betzig, 1986, 1993,
Zerjal et al., 2003) selecting for larger and more complex brains. Once a tool for inventing, learning, and
using these strategies (i.e., a complex brain) is in place, it can be used for a variety of other purposes
including coping with environmental, ecological, technological, linguistic, and other challenges.
Although these ideas are by now well-appreciated by many, and some components of the general
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scenario are supported by data (Byrne and Corp, 2004, Pawlowski et al., 1998, Sawaguchi, 1992, 1997),
verbal arguments and generalization from limited data alone are not enough to establish their general
plausibility and predict the relevant time-scales and expected dynamic patterns. Here we attempt to
shed some light on these questions using a stochastic individual-based explicit-genetic model.
Model
We consider a sexual diploid population, and focus on socially learned strategies (memes) used by males
to gain advantage in competition for mates. As a first step, we neglect analogous processes in females
(both for simplicity and because sexual selection in females is expected to be much less intense than in
males). Genes control the learning ability a and the cerebral capacity c of the brain which in turn control
how easily a brain learns new strategies (memes) and how many memes a brain can host, respectively.
Both a and c are treated as additive quantitative characters. That is, each trait value is found by summing
up the contributions of the corresponding alleles and then normalizing the result. Learning ability a is
normalized to be between 0 and 1, and cerebral capacity c is normalized to be between 0 and a positive
integer cmax. The loci controlling the two traits are independent, unlinked, diallelic, and have equal
effects. Both traits are viewed to be directly related to brain size and complexity and are assumed to be
under direct viability selection towards 0. This selection reflects costs (e.g., energetic or due to increased
death at childbirth) of having large brains. Note that setting the optimum values at 0 does not mean that
having no brain at all is optimum but rather reflects a scale chosen. Individuals surviving to adulthood
experience density-dependent mortality maintaining the population size close to a carrying capacity K.
Memes are invented and forgotten by individuals at small constant rates. Each meme is characterized
by its Machiavellian fitness µ and complexity pi (0 ≤ µ, pi ≤ 1). The former contributes to a male’s fitness
in between-male competitive interactions, while the latter defines how easily the meme can be learned.
The correlation ρ between µ and pi in newly invented memes is positive reflecting the idea that more
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advantageous memes are, generally, more complex and more difficult to learn. The rate of learning a
meme is directly proportional to learning ability a, inversely proportional to the meme’s complexity pi,
and declines with the ratio n/c where n is the number of memes already learnt by the brain.
The Machiavellian fitness m of a male is given by the sum of Machiavellian fitnesses of the memes he
has learnt. This implies that fitness increases with the number of memes learnt. The probability that a
contest between two males is won by a specific male is given by an S-shaped function of the corresponding
difference in their Machiavellian fitnesses. The male’s mating rate increases with the average proportion of
contests won. The strength of sexual selection in males is characterized by a parameter fmax measuring
the number of females fertilized by a male who wins all contests. The importance of competition for
mating success among males in the model captures another unique feature of hominids - that mating is
possible at most times and that the possibility of continual sexual provocation and competition between
males is very high (Chance and Mead, 1953). Offspring are produced with account of recombination,
segregation, and mutation.
In our model, there are two types of selection: among memes and among genes. Although interrelated,
they operate at different time-scales - fast for memes and slow for genes. To adequately capture this
important feature of gene-culture coevolution, we use an event-driven modeling framework in which time
is treated as continuous (see Methods). Our simulations start with a population of individuals having
zero learning ability and cerebral capacity. The population size varied between 50 and 150 individuals
which is compatible with social group sizes in hominids (Dunbar, 2003).
Numerical results and biological interpretations
Figure 1 shows the dynamics of the number of unique memes, the average learning ability, the average
cerebral capacity, and the average Machiavellian fitness of males in 20 runs with a default set of parameter
values. Each of these characteristics stays close to zero for several thousand generations during the
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Figure 1: The dynamics of (a) the number of unique memes, (b) the average learning ability, (c) the
average cerebral capacity, and (d) the average Machiavellian fitness in 20 runs with a default set of
parameter values (L = 16,K = 100, cmax = 32, fmax = 10, ρ = 0.5).
“dormant phase” and then suddenly starts rapidly increasing in a process that we will refer to as “cognitive
explosion.” Cognitive explosion ends when natural selection stops further increase in cognitive abilities
due to the costs of having large brains, and the system enters the “saturation phase.” During the whole
process the population stays genetically monomorphic except during relatively short periods of “selective
sweeps” when mutant alleles go to fixation (data not shown).
The dynamics before and at the onset of the cognitive explosion can be understood as follows. Nonzero
learning ability a and cerebral capacity c are advantageous only if the individual has both of them
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simultaneously and, during his life time, learns a meme (or memes) from other individuals. Otherwise,
individuals with a > 0 and/or c > 0 have reduced fitness due to decreased viability. The resulting fitness
landscape resembles that in models of compensatory mutations (Gavrilets, 2004, Kimura, 1985) where
a deleterious mutation in one locus can be compensated later on by an advantagenous mutation in a
different locus. During the dormant phase, one of the traits (i.e., learning ability or cerebral capacity)
can sporadically deviate away from zero by mutation and random genetic drift in spite of this deviation
causing a reduction in fitness. Cognitive explosion takes place when individuals with nonzero values of
one trait are maintained in the population sufficiently long for mutations changing the value of the other
trait in their offspring to occur and when both sets of new genes are maintained in the population long
enough for the individuals to learn new memes and start enjoying a fitness advantage.
The onset of cognitive explosion depends on parameter values and varies from run to run. Figure 2
illustrates the dependence of the median time T to cognitive explosion on the population carrying capacity
K, the number of loci L underlying each trait, the maximum cerebral capacity cmax, and the maximum
mating group size fmax when the correlation ρ between meme fitness and complexity is 0.5. This Figure as
well as a statistical analysis based on the Cox proportional-hazard regression (Andersen and Gill, 1982)
(data not shown) show that T decreases with increasing K,L, cmax, fmax and decreasing ρ. The effects
of K and L are the most pronounced which is compatible with the idea that the process of fixation of
compensatory mutations is mostly limited by the availability of new genetic variation (Gavrilets, 2004,
Kimura, 1985). With realistic parameter values the waiting time until the onset of cognitive explosion is
on the order of 5-25 thousand generations.
After the onset of the cognitive explosion, further increases in a and c by mutation are advantageous
because they allow individuals to learn more memes and, thus, achieve higher Machiavellian fitness and
mating rate. A novel feature of our framework is an explicit consideration of the dynamics of cerebral ca-
pacity c which we defined as a measure of the number of memes that the brain can host. In previous mod-
els, c was implicitly assumed to be fixed at one (Boyd and Richerson, 1985, Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman,
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Figure 2: The median time to cognitive explosion with ρ = 0.5.
1981) or infinity (Higgs, 2000). During the cognitive explosion phase, cerebral capacity c typically evolves
faster and achieves higher values than learning ability a (see Figure 3). This observation suggests that
higher values of cerebral capacity are more important than high learning ability and that there is more
potential for improving the latter than the former. Evolution of cognitive abilities results in a significant
reduction in individual viability (Figure 3) thus creating conditions for the evolution of mechanisms that
would reduce costs of having large brains such as postponing much of the brain growth to after birth
(Striedter, 2005) and reduction of the guts (Aiello and Wheeler, 1995). In our model, more complex
memes provide more fitness benefit to individuals. However, the complexity of memes present in the
population does not increase but, on the contrary, decreases in time (data not shown). This happens as
a result of intense competition among memes: while complex memes give advantage to individuals on a
longer (biological) time-scale, they lose competition to simpler memes on a shorter (social) time-scale.
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Figure 3: The dynamics of the learning ability a (solid line), normalized cerebral capacity c/cmax (dashed-
dot line) and viability v (dashed line) averaged over 20 runs shown in Figure 1.
In our simulations, the cognitive explosion phase lasts until the cerebral capacity reaches a maximum
possible level while the learning ability appears to equilibrate at an intermediate level determined by
a balance of reduced viability and increased mating success of individuals having big brains. Figure 4
illustrates the state of the population reached in 8,000 generations after the cognitive explosion. This
Figure and an analysis of variance (data not shown) shows that the average learning ability, cerebral
capacity, Machiavellian fitness, and the number of memes per individual all increase with cmax, fmax,
and K and decrease with ρ and L. The negative effect of the number of loci L on the characteristics
of cognitive abilities is explained by the fact that more loci means weaker selection on each individual
locus and, thus, weaker evolutionary response. Both the average Machiavellian fitness (Figure 4-c) and
the average number of memes per individual (Figure 4-d) correlate almost perfectly with the average
cerebral capacity (Figure 4-b) with the corresponding coefficients of correlation being 0.995. Overall, the
simulations show that significant values of c and a can be achieved within 5 to 10 thousand generations
after the onset of cognitive explosion.
It has been argued that throughout most of human history, success in social competition translated
into reproductive success with the most powerful men enjoying a disproportionate share of women and
offspring (Betzig, 1986, 1993, Zerjal et al., 2003). In our model, this effect is characterized by parameter
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fmax measuring the mating group size of a male who wins all between-male contests. This parameter
strongly affects the levels of learning ability and cerebral capacity achieved in the population. For example,
with L = 32, cmax = 64,K = 150 and ρ = 0.5 as fmax decreases from 20 to 10 to 5, the average learning
ability decreases from 0.36 to 0.33 to 0.30 (Figure 4-a) while the average cerebral capacity decreases from
57.0 to 54.5 to 47.5 (Figure 4-b). This suggests that as the extent to which social success translates
into reproductive success declines in modern societies, cognitive abilities are expected to be significantly
reduced by natural selection. We also expect that as the number of memes in the population dramatically
increases, learning ability will decrease further (because given a sufficiently large exposure to memes, they
will be learnt even by individuals with relatively low learning abilities).
Discussion
Here, we have built an explicit-genetic, individual-based, stochastic mathematical model of the coevolu-
tion of genes and memes aiming to explore the hypothesis of “Machiavellian intelligence.” In the model,
genes control the learning ability and cerebral capacity of brains which invent and learn strategies (memes)
which are used by males to gain advantage in competition for mates. Overall, our results suggest that
the mechanisms underlying this hypothesis can indeed result in a significant increase in the brain size
and in the evolution of significant cognitive abilities on the time scale of 10 to 20 thousand generations.
We show that in our model the dynamics of intelligence has three distinct phases. During the dormant
phase only newly invented memes are present in the population. These memes are not learned by other
individuals. During the cognitive explosion phase the population’s meme count and the learning ability,
cerebral capacity, and Machiavellian fitness of individuals rapidly increase in a runaway fashion. During
the saturation phase natural selection resulting from the costs of having large brains checks further
increases in cognitive abilities. Both the learning ability and cerebral capacity are subject to negative
natural selection due to costs of having large brains, but having nonzero values of both traits is necessary
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Figure 4: The characteristics of the population 8,000 generations after the cognitive explosion: (a) the
average learning ability, (b) the average cerebral capacity, (c) the average Machiavellian fitness, and
(d) the average number of memes per individual. ρ = 0.5.
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for learning and using different memes. The process of transition from the dormant phase to the cognitive
explosion phase is somewhat similar to that of the fixation of a compensatory mutation when higher fitness
is achieved by fixing two mutations each of which is deleterious by itself. As in the case of compensatory
mutations, the transition from the dormant phase to the cognitive explosion phase is mostly limited by
the availability of new genetic variation. The levels of cognitive abilities achieved during the cognitive
explosion phase increase with the intensity of competition for mates among males and decrease with
the number of loci controlling the brain size. The latter effect is explained by the fact that a larger
number of loci implies weaker selection on each individual locus. In our model, evolutionary processes
occur at two different time-scales: fast for memes and slow for genes. More complex memes provide more
fitness benefit to individuals. However, during the cognitive explosion phase the complexity of memes
present in the population does not increase but, on the contrary, decreases in time. This happens as a
result of intense competition among memes: while complex memes give advantage to individuals on a
slow (biological) time-scale, they lose competition to simpler memes on a fast (social) time-scale because
they are more difficult to learn. The increase in brain size results in a significant reduction in viability
thus creating conditions that favor rapid evolution of the mechanisms reducing the costs of having large
brains. One such mechanism is postponing much of the brain growth to after birth (Striedter, 2005)
while another is reduction of the guts (Aiello and Wheeler, 1995). Our model suggests that there may be
a tendency towards a reduction in cognitive abilities (driven by the costs of having a large brain) as the
reproductive advantage of having a large brain decreases and the exposure to memes increases in modern
societies.
The model studied here is based on a novel notion of “cerebral capacity” as a measure of the number
of different memes/ideas/strategies that the brain can learn socially and use. This measure is analogous
to “carrying capacity” used in ecology to characterize the number of individuals that can survive in a
given ecological niche. During the cognitive explosion phase, the cerebral capacity evolves faster and to
a larger degree than learning ability. Both the average Machiavellian fitness and the average number of
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memes per individual achieved during the cognitive explosion phase are largely controlled by the average
cerebral capacity. The importance of cerebral capacity in our model suggests that incorporation of this
notion into theoretical and empirical studies of cognitive processes can potentially be very beneficial.
The model studied here aims to describe only some aspects of the early stages of the evolution of
intelligence. The model should not be applied directly to actual human history and society. Our model
does not aim to explain why a cognitive explosion has occured only in the lineage leading to modern
Homo sapiens. Rather it tests whether a particular set of explanations advanced and discussed in detail
by many (Alexander, 1990, Byrne and Whiten, 1988, Dunbar, 1998, 2003, Flinn et al., 2005, Geary,
2005, Humphrey, 1976, Roth and Dicke, 2005, Striedter, 2005, Whiten and Byrne, 1997), which places
special emphasis on the achievement of “ecological dominance” and on competition in regard to social
competencies, is plausible from the population genetics perspective. Alternative explanations do exist
(e.g., Bingham 1999, Russon and Begun 2004, Vrba 1995), and much more work remains necessary to
better understand the origins of human uniqueness. As with most other mathematical models used in
evolutionary biology (e.g., Bu¨rger 2000, Ewens 1979, Fisher 1930, Gavrilets 2004, Haldane 1932, Kimura
1983, Wright 1969), the goal of our model is not to prove that a particular phemomena arises as a result
of particular factors. Rather we wished to explore the logic and plausibility of the arguments used to
explain the phenomenon, to identify important factors, parameters, and time-scales, and to check the
robustness of conclusions to variation in assumptions.
Our model has a number of limitations. Here we discuss some potential consequences of their violation.
We concentrated on a single population of small size. Allowing for more populations connected by
migration should accelerate the onset of cognitive explosion by increasing the amount of new genetic
variation. Once the cognitive explosion is initiated in a local population, emigrants (males or females)
will quickly spread their genes across the whole system. We allowed only for positive Machiavellian fitness
µ of memes. If memes with both positive and negative values of µ are possible, the process of cognitive
explosion is expected to be delayed as deleterious memes will occasionally spread through the population
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like an epidemic reducing the fitness advantage of having high cognitive abilities. We assumed that memes
are copied with no regard to the fitness or status of individuals they are learnt from. Selective imitation
when memes are more likely to be learned from high fitness/status individuals, should accelerate the
evolution of brain size. This expectation is supported by the fact that a behavior analogous to cognitive
explosion was observed in a much simpler and less realistic model of selective imitation (Higgs, 2000)
formalizing an integrant of Blackmore’s “big brain” hypothesis (Blackmore, 1999). We did not allow
for errors in meme copying. If such errors can only decrease the Machiavellian fitness of memes, then
the process of cognitive explosion will be slowed down. However if copying errors resulting in meme
improvement are possible, we expect higher Machiavellian fitnesses to be achieved which potentially can
accelerate the process. We conclude that overall, from the theoretical perspective, the phenomenon of
cognitive explosion, its patterns, and time-scales identified here appear to be robust.
Finally we note that the modeling framework we have developed can potentially be used to study
the evolution of languages (Nowak et al., 2002) and the coevolution of genes and culture in general
(Boyd and Richerson, 1985, Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981).
Methods
Here we provide some additional details on the model and simulations.
Constant viability selection. Viability (i.e., the probability to survive to the age of reproduction)
of a child with trait values a and c is
v = exp
{
−0.5
[(
a
σa
)2
+
(
c/cmax
σc
)2]}
,
where σa and σc are parameters measuring the strength of viability selection. The individual’s death rate
d is a function of v to be specified below.
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Frequency-dependent selection for mating success in males. The probability that a contest
between males i and j with Machiavellian fitnesses m(i) and m(i) is won by male i is
p(i, j) =
exp {γ [m(i)−m(j)]}
1 + exp {γ [m(i)−m(j)]}
,
where γ is a scaling parameter measuring how effectively an advantage in m is translated into larger value
of p. With this parameterization p(j, i) = 1− p(i, j) and the effects of memes known to both contestants
cancel out. The expected proportion of contests won by male i is pe(i) =
∑
j,j 6=i p(i, j)/(Nm − 1), where
Nm is the number of males in the population. The male’s mating rate is a function of pe(i) to be specified
below.
Events. There are five types of events: birth and death of individuals and invention, loss, and
replication of memes. We say that an event occurs at rate x if the probability of this event during a short
time interval dt is xdt.
Each female gives birth at a constant rate b. Male i is chosen to be the father with a probability
proportional to his mating group size
f(i) = fmin + (fmax − fmin) pe(i)
λ,
where fmin, fmax, and λ are parameters. Note that if pe(i) = 1 (i.e., the male wins all contests), f(i) =
fmax, and if pe(i) = 0 (i.e., the male looses all contests), f(i) = fmin. If one defines a parameter f0 as the
mating group size at pe(i) = 1/2 (which is the case when everybody has the same Machiavellian fitness),
then
λ = ln
(
fmax − fmin
f0 − fmin
)
/ ln 2.
Parameters fmin, f0, and fmax can be thought of as the effective number of females available to a male in
the corresponding category. One can set f0 = 1 with fmin < 1 < fmax. If a birth is to take place, a single
offspring is produced with account of recombination, segregation, and mutation. The sex is assigned
randomly. Then viability selection follows and surviving offspring instantaneously become adults.
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Adults die at rate d = N/K, where N is the overall population size and K is the population carrying
capacity.
Males invent new memes at a constant rate ν. The values of Machiavellian fitness µ and complexity pi
to be assigned to a new meme are drawn randomly from a truncated bivariate normal distribution with
constant means µ = 0.5, pi = 0.5, standard deviations σµ and σpi , and positive correlation ρ. Only the
values satisfying the conditions 0 < µ < 1, pimin < pi < 1, where pimin is a minimum meme complexity,
are allowed.
Each meme is forgotten at a constant rate δ.
Consider a meme with complexity pi present in the population in M copies. Consider also a male with
learning ability a and cerebral capacity c who has already learnt n other memes. The rate at which the
male aquires the new meme is η a
pi
exp
[
−β
(
n
c
)γ]
M , where η, β, and γ are positive scaling parameters.
The exponential term describes the brain’s saturation with memes. Note that if γ is large, then this term
is either close to 1 (if n < c) or close to zero (if n > c).
Simulations. The model dynamics are simulated using Gillespie’s direct method (Gillespie, 1977).
That is, the next event to happen is chosen according to the corresponding rates. The time interval until
the next event is drawn from an exponential distribution with a parameter equal to the sum of the rates
of all possible events. All rates are recomputed after each event.
Initial conditions and parameters. Initially, all individuals are identical homozygotes with a =
c = 0 and no memes. We varied the number of loci per trait (L = 8, 16, 32), the population carrying
capacity (K = 50, 100, 150), the maximum cerebral capacity (cmax = 16, 32, 64), the maximum mating
group size (fmax = 5, 10, 20), and the correlation between meme Machiavellian fitness and complexity
(ρ = 0.25, 0.5, 0.75). The following parameters did not change: mutation probability per locus 10−5,
σa = σc = 2, γ = 0.5, β = 1, γ = 10, b = 2.2, fmin = 0, ν = 0.01, δ = 0.02, η = 0.05, σµ = σpi = 0.25,
pimin = 0.05. 40 runs were done for each of 243 parameter combinations. Simulations ran for 30,000 time
units (roughly corresponding to 30,000 generations)
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